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I
In a number of areas of public law, a set of issues is organized
around a "doctrine" that purports to give order and regularity to
problems that might otherwise be treated as discrete and unrelated.
Ordinarily, organizing strategies of this sort are no cause for alarm;
they help provide structure and direction in areas that are indeed
closely connected. But on occasion, such strategies are highly misleading. By combining problems that are quite discrete, and by treating them at a high level of generality, they deflect attention from
more particular considerations that ought to be the central focus of
judicial attention.
One of the most prominent examples here is the "political question
doctrine" - a doctrine that is said to help courts decide when to
remove themselves from nonlegal controversies. To be sure, some decisions should not be subject to judicial resolution, but not because of
a unitary or general "political question doctrine."' When decisions
are immunized from the courts, it is because no particular constitutional provision forbids the governmental action at issue - a point
t
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recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in the original decision giving
rise to that doctrine.2 In resolving issues of this sort, it is far better
to attend to the nature of the constitutional disability in the particular case, rather than to a supposed "political question doctrine." The
question is whether the government's action violates a constitutional
provision, and that question is one on the merits.3
Similar considerations apply to the doctrine of "standing." Much
of the confusion of the last generation has been a product of a belief
that there is something called a unitary standing doctrine, one that is
independent of the particular rights created under particular constitutional and statutory provisions. Whether there is standing depends
on whether positive law has created a right to relief - sometimes a
complex question, to be sure, but one that will yield different answers in different contexts.
Much of the same is true of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Whether a condition is permissible is a function of the particular constitutional provision at issue; on that score, anything so general as an unconstitutional conditions doctrine is likely to be quite
unhelpful. The due process clause might well, for example, forbid
states from denying Medicare benefits to those who have had abortions; but if this is so, it is because the best interpretation of the
clause leads to that result, and not because of anything especially
revealing in the idea that some conditions are unconstitutional. The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot, in short, do much of the
work expected of it. It is far too crude and general a way to address
the multiple possible collisions between constitutional protections
and the modern regulatory state. Indeed, many of those collisions
have been approached in highly misleading ways, and ironically, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the source of the difficulty.
I will be arguing, in short, for particularism in cases involving unconstitutional conditions: for an inquiry, not into whether the greater
power includes the lesser, or whether the government can do "indirectly" what it cannot do "directly," but instead into whether the
particular infringement affects a protected interest in a constitutionally troublesome way, and, if so, whether the government is able to
justify any such effect. In order to ask and answer these questions, it

will be necessary to venture far beyond the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
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II
We might begin to explore the confrontation between constitutional rights and government expenditures through three possible
cases of unconstitutional conditions. In case one, the government
makes welfare benefits available to those, and only those, who have
spoken and who agree to speak favorably of the Democratic party.
In case two, the government says that it will pay for public schools
but not for private schools. In case three, the government funds all
medically necessary expenditures except those associated with
abortion.
In all of these cases, government has failed to intrude on rights
protected by the common law; in all of them, complaining citizens
are better off with the program (even including the condition) than
they would be if the program as a whole were eliminated. In all
three cases, the source of the difficulty lies in the possibility that
government might (a) be attempting to influence or (b) in fact be
influencing the decision to exercise a constitutional right. The two
possibilities are quite different. The first would point to an illicit governmental motivation: to use federal funds in a way designed to discourage people from availing themselves of a constitutional protection. The second would point to an impermissible effect: the use of
governmental funds in a way that pressures or coerces the exercise of
a right.
Both of these possibilities played a large role in the original development of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in which the Supreme Court attempted largely to protect Lochner-like rights from
invasion through the regulatory state.' In this respect, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine owes its origins to a judicial effort, in a
period of transition from the common law, to protect common-law
rights from a new form of interference. That effort was rooted in an
understanding that such rights could be pressured by something
other than common-law coercion - as, for example, when government made licenses or other benefits available on its own terms, by

subjecting them to conditions that led citizens not to exercise what
would otherwise be protected rights. Thus, in all three cases, it is no
longer sufficient to argue: (a) that the supposedly greater power not
5. The development is traced in Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword: UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1988). Epstein's own analysis is marked above all by its foundations in a
Lochner-like conception of the relationship between the citizen and the state. For a discussion, see Sunstein, supra note *.

to create or to abolish the program includes the supposedly lesser
power to create the program with the condition; (b) that the citizen
voluntarily accepted the condition because he willingly participated
in the program in the first instance; and (c) that the citizen cannot
complain because the program makes him better off than he would
be without it.'
But in all three cases, what sort of help does the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine offer? The doctrine operates as a shorthand response to these otherwise plausible arguments from the greater
power and waiver; sometimes it provides the basis for a broadside
attack on arguably unconstitutional conditions, on the theory that
government cannot do "indirectly" what it cannot do "directly." But
in order to resolve the three cases, or any other problem of this sort,
it is necessary to ask far more particular questions about the nature
of the constitutional right in the cases.
Case one, for example, is relatively simple. The reason is that the
first amendment, properly interpreted, does not permit government
to pressure the right to free expression in this way. That conclusion
is in turn a product of two subsidiary ideas: (1) The pressure imposed on the right to free expression through the use of monetary
incentives is a constitutionally significant burden, in light of the nature of the free expression interest, which calls for governmental
neutrality among different points of view; and (2) the government, in
the welfare setting, does not have available to it distinctive, financerelated interests that justify the imposition of that burden. It is
therefore impermissible, under the first amendment, for government
to make welfare available on the basis of this kind of selectivity.
Case two is also a simple one, at least under current law, and it
goes in precisely the opposite direction. To be sure, there is, under
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,7 a constitutional right to send one's children to private school. But there is no right to government funding
of that right even if the government does in fact fund the public
schools. For those who believe in a unitary unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the different results in cases one and two must be a
puzzle. The pressure exerted on the right by the government is precisely the same in both settings. Why is the government able to treat
speech rights in a way that it cannot treat the right to educate one's
children?

If there is an answer, it lies not in anything with which the uncon6. Although these arguments are insufficient, it is necessary, and not altogether
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stitutional conditions doctrine can be helpful, but instead in the different nature of the rights in the two cases. If current law is correct,
it is because the right to send one's children to private schools is a
distinctive one. It might be distinctive in the sense that it is not a
right to governmental fneutrality in general or in the abstract, but
instead merely a right to be free from criminal coercion in the private education of one's children. On this view, the right to educate
one's children does not require governmental neutrality as between
public and private schools, and it does not proscribe the use of funding to pressure that choice. This may or may not be a correct interpretation of the relevant right. But if it is incorrect, it is because of
nothing in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but instead because of something in the nature of the right.
If this distinction between the right recognized in Pierce and the
free speech right is unpersuasive, current law might nonetheless be
correct for a quite independent reason. Perhaps the differential use
of financial incentives in the setting of private schools is constitutionally troubling, and government must therefore come up with a powerful argument in its defense; but perhaps such an argument is available. The argument would go like this. Many taxpayers would have
severe objections to the public funding of religious schools. Those
objections are not only severe, but closely tied up with, and indeed
are an inextricable part of, the rationale behind the establishment
clause. In these circumstances, an interpretation of the right to educate one's children that would compel governmental neutrality would
wreak havoc with the deeper logic of the constitutional text. Governmental neutrality would, in short, bring about violations of the establishment clause. One might add here that any government has strong

and legitimate reasons to favor public over private education, in order (for example) to foster the development of an integrated national
(or state) polity. These reasons may well be insufficient to permit
prohibition of private schools without being so weak as to be insuffi-

cient to permit the funding of public but not private schools.'
All this should be enough to suggest that it is at least plausible to
understand the right to educate one's children in private schools as
not including a prohibition on the funding of public but not private
schools. If this is so, case one and case two properly come out differ8. Considerations of the sort suggested in this paragraph explain my uneasiness
with Professor McConnell's contribution to this symposium. See McConnell Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implicationsfor the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DiEGO L. REv. 255 (1989).

ently. The reason lies in the distinctive nature of the constitutional
rights in the two cases, and the availability of unusual justifications
in case two, justifications that permit government to invoke additional considerations in its support.
What of case three?9 Here an initial instinct would be to suggest
that it necessarily falls within case one. Roe v. Wade'0 recognized a
right to reproductive freedom, and that right, it would be argued,
cannot exist if government is permitted to fund childbirth but not
abortion. Such a distribution of financial incentives necessarily pressures the choice - particularly in the case at hand, which involves
indigent women.
This basic argument derives support from a current staple of modern unconstitutional conditions arguments - the distinction between
penalties and refusals to subsidize." A refusal to subsidize, on this
view, amounts to a constitutionally unobjectionable unwillingness to
ensure the exercise of a right. By contrast, a penalty represents a
sanction exacted by making citizens worse off than they would be if
the program were not created; a penalty is therefore constitutionally
suspect. In case three, it might be said, there is an impermissible
penalty since government is depriving citizens of something that they
would otherwise receive, that is, funding for all medically necessary
expenditures. 2
Ironically, these arguments reveal precisely what is wrong with a
general or unitary unconstitutional conditions doctrine; and it is possible to reach this conclusion without thinking that the arguments
are necessarily wrong. There are three points here. The first is that
the asserted characterization of the right in Roe v. Wade is by no
means self-evidently correct. Whether the right is one to governmen-

tal neutrality, or instead to freedom from criminal coercion, is not a
question that can be answered on the basis of the holding or rationale in Roe itself.' 3 That question depends on a far more complex
inquiry into the best argument available for the Roe outcome. There
is nothing illogical in reading Roe more narrowly, even if such a
reading would be incorrect on balance. On that view, the Roe right
would be akin to the right in Pierce.
The second point is that in the setting of financial expenditures,
government possibly has available to it distinctive finance-related
justifications that serve to legitimate any burdens on the relevant
9. The case is, of course, drawn from Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
!1. The distinction is made central in Harris. For a general discussion, see
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984).
12. This is the argument in Kreimer, supra note 11.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
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right. Many taxpayers would severely object to the use of taxpayer
money to fund an activity that they consider the moral analogue of
murder. These objections do not have the weight that would ground
a serious free exercise objection to the use of federal funds to pay for
abortion. But the objections might well make it permissible - not
necessary, but permissible - for government to decide not to fund
abortions even if it cannot criminalize them.
The third point is that the question whether the denial of funds for
abortion is a "penalty" or a "refusal to subsidize" is both difficult to
answer and - more importantly - constitutionally irrelevant. To
decide the penalty-subsidy question, it is necessary to identify some
status quo, or baseline, in order to conceive of the alternative universe from which the current deviation is to be measured. 4 In a pe-

riod in which governmental regulatory programs interact with common-law rights in complex ways, that question is almost impossible
to sort out. More fundamentally, the question whether a denial of
funding operates as a "penalty" or as a "refusal to subsidize" is not,
for constitutional purposes, the important one. The question is instead whether the governmental action at issue intrudes on the relevant right in a constitutionally troublesome way, and if so, whether
the government has available legitimate justifications that are sufficiently weighty to justify any such intrusion. The penalty or subsidy
inquiry does not help to answer this question.
These considerations hardly supply a decisive argument in favor of
government programs that subsidize childbirth but not medically
necessary abortions. It might well be that the right in Roe should in
fact be characterized as a right to governmental neutrality - an
argument that would draw strength if one accepts the view that the
Roe outcome is best understood as a case involving sex discrimination and predictable adverse consequences for poor women. 15 It
might well be that taxpayers' moral objections to public funding of
abortion are not, in view of the best characterization of the relevant
right, sufficiently weighty to justify the intrusion. This view might be
supported by analogy to cases involving speech, religious, and nondiscrimination rights, where, as a general rule, the moral objections
of the taxpaying public are insufficient to permit selectivity in
funding.
These are complex questions, and they cannot be answered here.
14.

See Sullivan, supra note 6; Kreimer, supra note 11.

15. See Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: InalienableRights, Affirmative

Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1985).

For present purposes, the central point is that in our three cases involving arguably 'unconstitutional conditions - under current law,
the first an easy call for the citizen, the second an easy call for the
government, and the third a difficult call that produced a split Supreme Court - the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been entirely unhelpful. Cases that fall within the general category of unconstitutional conditions problems require a quite particular analysis
of the nature of the relevant right. Whether there is a penalty or a
subsidy is immaterial. Sometimes the government may do indirectly
what it cannot do directly. The relevant cases must be argued on the
merits, in terms of the appropriate conception of the relevant right;
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot do any of the necessary work.
All this is not to suggest that the doctrine has served no function,
and it is hardly to say that cases involving conditions on governmental programs do not call up distinctive considerations. The doctrine
has been helpful in answering familiar objections to the use of constitutional review in this area, and those objections are indeed misguided.1 6 Moreover, reviews of funding programs do share distinctive
common inquiries -

as we have seen -

into the nature of the right

and the character of governmental justifications. The principal problem with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that it tends to
focus attention away from these questions, which are the correct
ones, to other questions altogether - questions that probably cannot
be answered and that in any case need not be asked.
III
We have seen that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is an
awkward and crude effort to bring under constitutional scrutiny a
range of measures that affect constitutional rights in serious ways,
but that would not otherwise be subject to serious judicial review.
The doctrine does help to identify a technique of burdening constitutional rights,'7 and thus to alert courts that a serious constitutional
issue may be present notwithstanding both the absence of commonlaw "coercion"' 8 and the possibility that the person who has accepted both the benefit and the burden is on balance better off as a
result of the deal. In coming to terms with the questions raised by
the relevant cases, however, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is inadequate in two fundamental ways.
First, it focuses attention on the largely immaterial question
16.
17.
18.
idea. see
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For a discussion of the unfortunate legacy and surprising persistence of this
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whether there is a "threat" (penalty) or an "offer" (subsidy). This is
an extraordinarily complex question that courts are unlikely to be

able sensibly to unpack. More importantly, the question is not the
one that, as a general rule, the Constitution tells courts to ask.
Second, and most fundamentally, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine tends to lead courts to disregard the extraordinary particularity of the settings in which problems under this rubric tend to
arise. Whether a condition is unconstitutional depends on whether
the relevant clause, properly interpreted, makes the particular burden a constitutionally troubesome one, and, if so, whether the government has available to it - because of the setting - distinctive
justifications that make its action permissible. These are not simple
questions, but they are the relevant ones. We do not need an unconstitutional conditions doctrine in order to ask them.

